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PROTOCOLS WITH AN ABORT OPTION
Before proving our main results, we want to extend our definitions to allow for the possibility that Alice may abort the
protocol. In a relativistic KCEKQS protocol with abort option, each party may have several trusted agents occupying separate
secure laboratories, with secure communications between them, lying within pre-agreed regions. One agent of Bob’s initially
possesses QB. The protocol requires Alice’s and Bob’s agents to carry out unitary operations and/or measurements on quantum
systems in their possession and to send classical and/or quantum communications to given other agents of the same party and/or
the other party, within their agreed location regions and within agreed time intervals. The protocol may specify these actions are
probabilistically determined, according to given probability distributions.[12]
After each round of receiving data, each of Alice’s agents generates one of two possible outcomes, 0 and 1, from the classical
and quantum information in her possession. If she gets outcome 0, she announces to Bob’s neighbouring agents, within a pre-
agreed time interval, that the protocol is aborted. Bob’s agent communicates this to Bob’s other agents. Alice’s agent also
announces the abort to all of Alice’s other agents. Any agent who receives an abort message stops participating in the protocol
from that point.
If there is no abort, the protocol terminates after a fixed finite number of communications between Alice’s and Bob’s agents.
The allowed timings of abort announcements and of Bob’s final announcement are fixed so that, in the event of any valid abort
announcement, no agent of Bob’s will announce the protocol outcome. If there is no abort, then the final prescribed action is
for one of Bob’s agents to generate one of two possible outcomes, 0 and 1, from the classical and quantum information in his
possession. These correspond to Bob rejecting or accepting that Alice has provided evidence of knowledge of η. The possible
outcomes are thus disjoint events 0, 1, abort. We write p(0), p(1), p(abort) for the outcome probabilities.
A non-relativistic protocol with abort option proceeds similarly, with Alice having the option to announce an abort after each
Bob-to-Alice communication before Bob’s final announcement.
Non-triviality for protocols with an abort option:
We define ǫC, ǫK and ǫS as before. We say a protocol with abort is non-trivial if 1− ǫC > ǫS, as before.
Comments: 1. Our definition of non-triviality is intended to characterise what might reasonably be considered to be a
useful knowledge-evidencing protocol. Consider two possible hypotheses. The first is that Alice has no classical or quantum
information correlated with η. The second is that Alice knows the classical value of η precisely and follows the protocol honestly.
If the protocol allows Alice to attain a higher or equal value of p(1) when the first hypothesis holds than the value attained when
the second holds, then outcome 1 gives Bob no evidence to prefer the second hypothesis over the first. Our non-triviality
condition excludes this possibility, meaning that outcome 1 gives Bob at least some evidence to prefer the second hypothesis
over the first. (Of course, there are other possible hypotheses. For example, Alice could have some definite classical information
about η, or some beliefs about η that she expresses in a probability distribution, or some quantum information correlated with
η, or combinations of these. Non-triviality does not necessarily imply that the outcome 1 gives Bob evidence in favour of the
hypothesis that Alice knows η precisely and follows the protocol honestly compared to any of these hypotheses.)
Outcome 1 is the only outcome that can sensibly have this property. Bob can never rely on an abort as giving evidence that
Alice knows η, since a dishonest Alice can always abort. And it makes no sense for an outcome 0 to give positive evidence that
Alice knows η compared to outcome 1: if this were the case then the protocol outcomes should be relabelled.
2. In fact, a weaker definition of non-triviality suffices for our no-go theorem below. Let p(x|ψ; η) be the probability dis-
tribution for the three outcomes x ∈ {0, 1, abort} when the state of QB is ψ, Bob performs the protocol correctly, and Alice
performs the version of the protocol which would be correct if she knew that the state of QB were η. Then it is sufficient that
p(x|ψ; η) depends non-trivially on ψ for fixed η.
2NO-GO THEOREMS
Zero-knowledge
Theorem 1. There exists no non-trivial KCEKQS protocol which is zero-knowledge.
Proof. Consider a non-trivial KCEKQS protocol P applied to a system QB with Hilbert space HB . In any such protocol Bob
may replace the unknown state η by any state of his choice. Suppose that he does so, but that the protocol is otherwise honestly
performed by both parties, with Alice acting in the belief that the unknown state is η. The protocol then defines a quantum
measurement operation P η onQB. Now if Bob inputs a randomly chosen pure state φ ∈ QB, non-triviality and continuity imply
that there is a neighbourhoodN of φ with nonzero measure δ (with respect to the uniform measure), such that
P (η ∈ N | outcome 1 ) > δ .
Nontriviality and continuity also imply that ǫC < 1 and that P ( outcome 1 ) > 0. Hence, with nonzero probability, Bob
gains some nontrivial information about the distribution of η from this operation. Since he retains η, he also can carry out any
measurement he wishes on η. Combining information from the two processes gives him on average strictly more information
than is available from the measurement alone. Hence ǫK > ǫM and the protocol is not zero-knowledge.
Completeness vs soundness
Theorem 2. In a KCEKQS protocol for a pure quantum state in a Hilbert space of dimension d, the completeness and soundness
parameters obey
ǫS
1− ǫC
≥
1
d
.
Proof. A protocol P for KCEKQS may require either party to carry out measurements, to make random choices from a classical
probability distribution, to introduce quantum states, and/or to send classical data. For any such protocol, we can define a related
fully quantum protocol QP in which all data are introduced as quantum ancillae at the start and kept at the quantum level
until the outcomes are obtained. Thus, to define QP from P , measurements are replaced by unitary measurement interactions
(without extracting measurement data), classical random choices are replaced by interactions with entangled “quantum dice”
(without extracting data about the dice outcome) and classical communications are replaced by quantum communications of
states in a pre-agreed orthonormal basis (for instance the computational basis). We take the protocol QP to proceed thus until
the last steps. The first of these is for all the information in Alice’s possession to be sent to one of Alice’s agents, who carries out
a measurement giving her the outcome abort or not abort. She communicates this outcome to all of Alice’s and all of Bob’s
agents, within an agreed time window, so that Bob’s agents all know the outcome after a prespecified coordinate time. If no
abort is communicated to any of Bob’s agents within the prescribed time, they send all the information in their possession to one
of Bob’s agents, who carries out a single measurement giving him the outcome 1 or 0.
We take the Hilbert spaces under Alice’s and Bob’s control initially to be HA and HB respectively, and the Hilbert spaces
under Alice’s and Bob’s control at the end of the protocol to be HAf and HBf . The initial and final Hilbert spaces for each
party are not necessarily identical, since the protocol may require states to be sent from one party to another. By introducing
ancillae as necessary, we may take the final measurements by Alice and Bob to be projective measurements (PAf , IAf − PAf )
and (PBf , IBf − PBf ).
If both parties are honest, the probabilities of all outcomes are the same in QP as in P . If Bob is honest, then it cannot be
disadvantageous to Alice to replace P by QP : all strategies available to her in the former can be replicated in the latter, and the
latter also generally offers her further strategies. In particular, the strategy we define below for Alice, when she does not know
η, has the same success probabilities in QP and P . We may therefore, for simplicity, without loss of generality assume a fully
quantum protocol. We will write ηB for Bob’s unknown state when we wish to emphasize that it is initially under Bob’s control.
Let SAB be the state of all the ancillae introduced by Alice and Bob in QP , and let U
η be the unitary operation defined by the
protocol up to the final outcome measurements, when Alice honestly follows the protocol and believes the state is η. Here Uη
includes any state transfers between the parties, as well as local unitaries applied by each party. Thus Uη maps HA ⊗ HB to
HAf ⊗HBf .[13] We have∫
Tr(((IAf − PAf )⊗ PBf )U
η(ηB ⊗ SAB)(U
η)†)dµ(η) = 1− ǫC
3where dµ( ) denotes the uniform measure over quantum states, and the integral is performed over the entire Hilbert space ofQB.
Now suppose Alice does not in fact know η. Then she may always adopt the strategy of choosing a random state φ from the
Hilbert space of QB and proceeding with the protocol as if she knows that QB is in the state φ. Since aborting cannot increase
p(1), an optimum strategy to maximise p(1) is never to abort, i.e. to take PAf = 0. Assuming that Bob always performs his part
of the protocol honestly, the expected value of p(1) is then∫ ∫
Tr((IAf ⊗ PBf )U
φ(ηB ⊗ SAB)(U
φ)†)dµ(η)dµ(φ) ≤ ǫS .
Moving the integral inside the trace, and noting that
∫
ψdµ(ψ) = 1
d
IB, where IB is the d-dimensional identity matrix onQB,
we obtain
1
d
∫
Tr((IAf ⊗ PBf )U
φ(IB ⊗ SAB)(U
φ)†)dµ(φ) ≤ ǫS.
The left hand side is bounded below by
1
d
∫
Tr((IAf ⊗ PBf )U
φ(φB ⊗ SAB)(U
φ)†)dµ(φ) ,
which is bounded below by
1
d
∫
Tr(((IAf − PAf )⊗ PBf )U
φ(φB ⊗ SAB)(U
φ)†)dµ(φ) =
1
d
(1− ǫC) .
Hence ǫS1−ǫC ≥
1
d
as required.
CLASSICAL PROTOCOLS
As noted in the main text, Horodecki et al. [1] argue, inter alia, that non-trivial zero-knowledge classical A-to-B protocols with
ǫC = 0 are impossible for a qubit. For such protocols, Alice must predict some measurement outcome, and any measurement
prediction that holds with certainty for a pure qubit η and is not certain for a random qubit allows Bob to identify η exactly, and
so has ǫK = 1. Horodecki et al. did not analyse protocols involving qudits and also did not consider protocols with ǫC > 0. One
way of realising such protocols is for Alice to choose a projective measurement including a randomly chosen projector P from
those with 〈η|P |η〉 ≥ 1− ǫC and predict the likeliest outcome to Bob.
Clearly, however, any qudit protocol in which Alice simply sends Bob a classical prediction of a measurement outcome has
similar issues to the qubit protocols which Horodecki et al. analysed[1]. Whenever the prediction is highly likely ifQB is in state
η and not so likely if QB is in a random state, Bob can obtain a significant amount of information about η simply by examining
the prediction and calculating the set of states for which it is highly likely. Moreoever, if Bob assumes that Alice is honest, he
may choose to refrain from performing the measurement necessary to confirm her prediction and instead carry out some other
measurement, thus gaining additional information.
Horodecki et al. also did not consider relativistic protocols. Moving to the setting of relativistic quantum cryptography pro-
vides ways to strengthen prediction protocols somewhat, since Alice can use secure relativistic bit commitments [2–6] to commit
her predictions, conferring two potential advantages. First, Alice can commit to more than one outcome and subsequently reveal
to Bob only the outcome corresponding to the result that he has obtained, thus decreasing the amount of information that Bob
obtains simply from the fact that she has made a certain prediction. Second, Alice need not reveal her prediction to Bob unless
he first tells her the predicted outcome. The intuition is that this essentially forces Bob to carry out (something close to) the
specified measurement if he wishes to have a significant chance of getting information from Alice. This prevents him from
carrying out a different measurement that gives him (much) additional information.
We now consider classical protocols which use relativistic bit commitment protocols for one or both of these purposes.
Classical relativistic KCEKQS protocol 1:
There is some agreed frame in which the agents are agreed to remain at approximately the same position coordinates through-
out the protocol, respecting the configurations given below. We take space and time coordinates with respect to this frame. We
work in units with c = 1 throughout this paper.
1. Alice and Bob each have two agents, A1, A2 and B1, B2, configured so that d = d(A1, B1) ≈ d(A2, B2) ≪ D =
d(A1, B2) ≈ d(A2, B1), as in the relativistic bit commitment protocol of Ref. [3].
42. Alice chooses a projective measurement {Pi} such that ∃x : Tr(Pxη) ≥ 1− ǫC. The value of x is secretly shared by both
her agents.
3. At t = 0 Alice’s agent A1 tells Bob’s agent B1 the measurement {Pi}. Also at t = 0, Alice’s agent A2 and Bob’s agent
B2 initiate a relativistic bit string commitment protocol committing A2 to the binary encoding of the index x.
4. At t = δ ≪ D, B1 performs the measurement {Pi} onQB and reports his result to A1.
5. At t = δ′, where δ′ > δ and δ′ ≪ D, if B1 reported the result Px, A1 unveils the commitment made by A2. If not, the
commitment is not unveiled.
6. IfA1 unveils a commitment that matches Px, Bob accepts the proof, after verifying the unveiled commitment by collecting
data from his two agents. Otherwise, he rejects.
Note: The time coordinates given for this and later relativistic protocols are merely examples of possible timings. The key
requirement is that the timings should ensure that at each step, relativistic signalling constraints ensure that the relevant agent of
Alice can have no information about data supplied to the other agent by Bob’s corresponding agent at the previous commitment
round (if any).
Security discussion: First, note that there is no exchange of quantum information in this protocol. For the purposes of
security analysis, it can be treated as a relativistic bit string commitment protocol, in which Alice commits to the bit string
defining x via parallel repetition of the protocol of Ref. [3]. For Alice to cheat, she must be able to unveil the possible bit strings
y with success probabilities py for which
∑
y py is significantly greater than 1. Conversely, to prove it secure against Alice
requires showing that the relativistic bit string commitment protocol ensures that
∑
y py ≤ 1+ ǫ(N, d), whereN is the protocol
security parameter and ǫ(N, d)→ 0 as N →∞ for each finite d.
A full proof of security against Alice for this protocol thus requires analysis of the behaviour of the bit commitment protocol
of ref [3] under parallel repetition. The security proof of [3] for of single round classical relativistic bit commitment holds for
both classical and quantum attacks. The extension of this argument to bit strings is an interesting topic in its own right, and we
leave discussion of this for future work.
In the present discussion we simply assume without proof that, in the limit as the security parameters for the bit commit-
ments become large, Alice can effectively commit to only one outcome of the measurement (or to some convex combination of
outcomes if she makes a probabilistic commitment). Under this assumption, if Alice has no information about the state η, her
optimal strategy is simply to commit to a randomly chosen outcome. Hence the value of ǫS is
1
d
, and so ǫS → 0 as d→∞.
Comment: On the other hand, the protocol does not provide a good trade-off between completeness and knowledge
concealment. Assuming Alice does indeed know the state η, the protocol succeeds with probability at least (1− ǫC). In this case
Bob learns the value of a projection Px with Tr(Pxη) ≥ 1− ǫC.
Hence
ǫK ≥ (1− ǫC)
2 . (1)
This is a very poor trade-off; in particular ǫC ≈ 0 implies ǫK ≈ 1.
For comparison, if Bob does not take part in the protocol but instead carries out operations on QB, the maximum expected
fidelity of his estimate for η is ǫM =
2
d+1 . For ǫC ≈ 0 we thus have ǫK− ǫM &
d−1
d+1 ≥
1
3 , and for d large we have ǫK− ǫM ≈ 1.
One way to improve on the bound (1), at the price of increasing ǫS, is to allow Alice to commit to more than one outcome of
the projective measurement. We now consider a protocol of this type.
Classical relativistic KCEKQS protocol 2:
As with the previous protocol, there is some agreed frame in which the agents are agreed to remain at approximately the same
position coordinates throughout the protocol, respecting the configurations given below. We take space and time coordinates
with respect to this frame.
1. Alice and Bob each have two agents, A1, A2 and B1, B2, configured so that d = d(A1, B1) ≈ d(A2, B2) ≪ D =
d(A1, B2) ≈ d(A2, B1), as in the relativistic bit commitment protocol of Ref. [3].
2. Alice chooses a projective measurement {Pi} for which there exists a set S consisting of q measurement elements such
that Tr((
∑
i∈S Pi)|η〉〈η|) = 1 − ǫC for some agreed value of ǫC. The indices x ∈ S are secretly shared by both her
agents.
53. At t = 0, Alice’s agent A1 tells Bob’s agent B1 the measurement {Pi}. Also at t = 0, Alice’s agent A2 and Bob’s agent
B2 initiate a relativistic bit string commitment protocols committing A2 to the binary encoding of each index x ∈ S.
4. At t = δ ≪ D, B1 performs the measurement {Pi} onQB and reports his result to A1.
5. At t = δ′, where δ′ > δ and δ′ ≪ D, if B1 reported a result Px with x ∈ S, A1 unveils the commitment to x made by A2.
The remaining commitments are not unveiled.
6. IfA1 unveils a commitment that matches Px, Bob accepts the proof, after verifying the unveiled commitment by collecting
data from his two agents. Otherwise, he rejects.
We now show that, conditional on our previously stated assumptions about the security of relativistic bit commitment proto-
cols:
ǫK ≥ q(
1− ǫC
q
)2 and ǫS =
q
d
.
Proof. As in the previous proof, we assume that the bit commitment protocol remains secure under parallel repetition. Hence
we limit our discussion to strategies where Alice commits honestly to a single set of q out of d possible measurement outcomes
in the bit commitment protocol.
If Alice has no information about the state η, then she has no better strategy than choosing q random orthogonal one-
dimensional projections. Hence ǫS =
q
d
, i.e. q = ǫSd.
The relativistic bit commitment protocol [3] is perfectly secure against Bob both for a single bit commitment and when
composed to define a bit string commitment: in either case, he obtains no information about Alice’s commitments unless and
until she unveils them.
Suppose then that Alice knows η and randomly chooses a projective measurement {Pi} for which there exists a set S con-
sisting of q measurement elements such that Tr((
∑
i∈S Pi)η) = 1 − ǫC. If Bob follows the protocol and carries out this
measurement, he obtains outcome Pi with probability pi = Tr(Piη). If Alice’s unveiled commitment confirms that i ∈ S, Bob’s
maximum expected squared fidelity guess is η = Pi, which has squared fidelity pi. Hence
ǫK ≥
∑
i∈S
(pi)
2 ≥ q(
1− ǫC
q
)2 = (1 − ǫC)
2q−1 .
For comparison, if Bob does not take part in the protocol but instead carries out operations on QB, the maximum expected
fidelity of his estimate for η is ǫM =
2
d+1 . For ǫC ≈ 0 and q ≪
d
2 we thus have ǫK ≫ ǫM.
Comment A variation on this protocol is for Alice to randomly choose a projective measurement {Pi} from among those
for which there exists a set S consisting of q measurement elements such that Tr((
∑
i∈S Pi)η) ≥ 1− ǫ. She could, for example,
use the uniform measure on the complete projective decompositions satisfying this criterion. This variation has ǫC < ǫ, since
Alice’s average success probability, when she knows η, is greater than 1− ǫ. Similarly, it has ǫK > (1− ǫ)
2q−1 > (1− ǫC)
2q−1.
QUANTUM ALICE-TO-BOB PROTOCOLS
Throughout this section, we use the notation w(a, b) =
(
a+b−1
a
)
.
We first show that the value of ǫS for the quantum Alice-to-Bob protocol set out in the main article is
1
N+1 +
N
d(N+1) .
If Alice does not in fact know η, the probability that Bob’s measurement obtains a positive result is maximized if she chooses
a single state φ and prepares all N systems {Si} in the state φ.
We use the fact that Tr(ΠS(|φ〉〈φ|
⊗N ⊗ I⊗M )ΠS) =
w(M+N,d)
w(N,d) [7]. Thus when Alice employs the optimum strategy, the
probability that Bob ’s measurement obtains a positive outcome is given by:
ǫS =
∫
Tr(Π(|φ〉〈φ|⊗N ⊗ ψ)Π)dµ(ψ) = Tr(Π(|φ〉〈φ|⊗N ⊗
I
d
)Π) =
w(N + 1, d)
w(N, d)d
=
1
N + 1
+
N
d(N + 1)
(2)
6In particular, for N = 1, we have
ǫS =
1
2
+
1
2d
and ǫS >
1
2 for any d.
We can also bound ǫK. If Alice follows the protocol honestly, Bob has available N + 1 copies of the state η. His average
squared fidelity between the true state η and the best possible guess from measuring N + 1 states is N+2
N+1+d [8]. Thus ǫK =
N+2
N+1+d . Similarly, setting N = 0, we have that Bob’s optimal average squared fidelity guess from the original copy of η is
ǫM =
2
d+1 .
From equation (2), we obtain ǫK >
1
dǫS
and ǫK − ǫM >
d−1
d+1
N
N+2
1
dǫS
. In particular, near CS-optimality (ǫS ≈
1
d
) requiresN
large, which implies near-zero concealment (ǫK ≈ 1) and significant knowledge gain (ǫK − ǫM ≈
d−1
d+1 ). For large d, this also
implies near-complete knowledge gain (ǫK − ǫM ≈ 1).
Note that Bob can both follow this protocol honestly in order to gain evidence about Alice’s knowledge of the quantum state,
and then also afterwards attempt to estimate η from the N + 1 states in his possession since the states of these copies of η are
not changed in the course of a protocol in which both parties are honest. Thus, if Alice honestly follows the protocol, Bob can
obtain evidence of her knowledge of η and still attain the value of ǫK =
N+2
N+1+d above.
QUANTUM BOB-TO-ALICE PROTOCOL
We beginwith a complete description of the quantumB-to-A protocol summarised in the main text, including the configuration
of agents required for the relativistic bit commitment sub-protocols. As with the earlier protocols, there is some agreed frame
in which the agents are agreed to remain at approximately the same position coordinates throughout the protocol, respecting the
configurations given below. We take space and time coordinates with respect to this frame.
1. Alice and Bob each have two agents, A1, A2 and B1, B2, configured so that d = d(A1, B1) ≈ d(A2, B2) ≪ D =
d(A1, B2) ≈ d(A2, B1), as in the relativistic bit commitment protocol of Ref. [3].
2. Alice and Bob agree in advance on positive integer security parametersN and q.
3. Bob givesQB to B1, who preparesN additional quantum systems {Si} in states chosen uniformly at random.
4. B1 randomly permutes the systems {Si} and the system QB, assigns them all indices from 1 to N + 1, and then gives all
N + 1 systems, labelled by their indices, to A1.
5. A1 carries out the projective measurement {η , I − η} on each of the N + 1 systems that B1 gave her. Write C
′ for the
list of indices for which she obtains outcome η; let |C′| = q′. If q′ ≤ q, she forms a list C = C′ ∪D, whereD is a list of
(q − q′) copies of the dummy index 0.[14]. If q′ > q, she picks a random size q sublist C of C′.
6. A1 randomly permutes C. At t = 0, B1 and A1 initiate q relativistic bit string commitments [3] committing A1 to
each of the indices in the permuted list. Each bit string commitment is set up so that Alice can commit to any index in
{1, 2, . . .N + 1}. This commitment is sustained by B2 and A2 at time t = δ, where 0 < δ ≪ D. These commitments
involve a further security parameterN ′.
7. At t = δ′, where 0 < δ′ ≪ D (and for definiteness we may take δ′ > δ) B1 tells A1 the index x ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1} that
he assigned to QB.
8. If x ∈ C, A1 unveils her commitment to that index (which she initiated and A2 sustained). Otherwise she announces
failure (or aborts, if the protocol includes an abort option) and Bob rejects.[15]
9. If Alice’s unveiled commitment is indeed x, Bob accepts, once he is able to verify this by comparing data from his agents.
Otherwise he rejects.
7Security against Alice
Alice’s most general possible strategy starts by pre-sharing some quantum state between A1 and A2. A1 receives additional
quantum systems from B1, namely (N + 1) qudits. She can then carry out any quantum operation on the quantum systems in
her control, depending on the classical data sent by B1, to generate responses to B1 that purport to initiate the bit commitment
protocols. A2 can similarly carry out any quantum operation on the quantum systems in her control, depending on the classical
data sent by B2, to generate responses to B2 that purport to sustain the protocols. A1 can then carry out any further quantum
operation on the quantum systems under her control, depending on the index x sent byB1, to generate data that purport to unveil
x as one of her committed strings.
A full security analysis against Alice thus requires a discussion of security for a protocol composed of two rounds of a series
of relativistic bit commitment sub-protocols together with the remaining steps of the protocol above. We leave this discussion for
a future more general analysis of protocols within which relativistic bit commitments are suitably composable. For the present
discussion, we will make the restrictive assumption that Alice honestly follows each relativistic bit commitment protocol [3] for
the first two rounds and uses no quantum information in these relativistic bit commitment protocols. Thus we assume that A1
and A2 have pre-shared classical random numbers which they use, following the protocol [3], to commit Alice to some definite
classical bit value in the first round of each bit commitment, and to sustain each of these commitments in the second round.
Given that A1 and A2 follow this honest strategy to commit and sustain the commitment to a definite classical bit value b for
the first two rounds, let pS(b¯) be the probability (for any unveiling strategy S) that A1 can successfully unveil the opposite bit
value b¯ at the unveiling (third) stage. Each individual relativistic bit commitment used in the protocol has the property [3] that
pS(b¯) ≤ ǫ(N
′), where ǫ(N ′) → 0 as the security parameter N ′ → ∞. We will assume N ′ is very large compared to N and
neglect terms of order ǫ(N ′) in the following discussion. (Note that the equalities and inequalities proven are thus correct only
up to order ǫ(N ′)). In this limit, and modulo our assumptions, the individual relativistic bit commitments are perfectly secure
against Alice. Given her restricted strategy, her only options are to honestly commit to strings of bits {bi} and then either to
unveil any given bit commitment, revealing the actual committed bit value bi, or to decline to unveil it.
Soundness
We now argue that, given these assumptions, if the protocol involves an unknown d-dimensional state, and we take (N +1) =
Md for integerM , and q = N+1
d
=M , then ǫS =
1
d
.
Proof. Alice can achieve a success probability of q
N+1 by simply committing to q random distinct indices, and hence ǫS ≥
q
N+1 .
We now show that also ǫS ≤
q
N+1 , and hence ǫS =
q
N+1 .
Suppose that A1 andA2 begin the KCEKQS protocol with no information whatsoever about η, and that Bob honestly follows
the protocol. From Alice’s perspective, she simply receives (N + 1) random pure qudits, since η is a random qudit and the
remaining qudits are independently randomly chosen by Bob. Thus until B1 gives A1 classical information about the index
assigned to QB, A1 and A2’s state of knowledge is exactly symmetrical with respect to all of the N + 1 qudits sent by B1. A1
is required to initiate commitments, and A2 to sustain them, before they receive the index assigned to QB, and therefore their
commitment strategy on these rounds cannot depend on that index.
Thus we may without loss of generality calculate Alice’s success probability by considering some fixed commitment strategy
and averaging over all N + 1 possible values for the index of QB. For simplicity, we will analyse a related protocol T in which
Alice always makes q commitments and subsequently unveils all q commitments. We will say that Alice is successful in T if and
only if at least she unveils at least one valid commitment to the correct index forQB (whether or not other unveiled commitments
turn out to be valid commitments to any index). Alice’s success probability ǫS in the KCEKQS protocol is no greater than her
success probability in T , since in either case Alice succeeds if and only if she can unveil at least one commitment to the correct
index.
Now, for the purpose of obtaining a contradiction, suppose that Alice can succeed in protocol T with probability greater
than q
N+1 . If the probability distribution over the values of Alice’s unveiled commitments in task T depends only on her initial
commitment strategy and not on the classical information she subsequently obtains from Bob, then the values of her q unveiled
commitments must be uncorrelated with the index ofQB. Therefore the probability that one of these q unveiled commitments is
to the correct index for QB can be no greater than
q
N+1 , with this bound saturated whenever Alice uses a strategy which always
produces q valid commitments to different bit values in {1, 2, ...N +1}. Thus if the success probability is greater than q
N+1 , the
probability distribution over the values of her unveiled commitments must be correlated with the classical information that she
receives from Bob.
If so, under our assumptions about Alice’s restricted strategy, Alice must have some freedom to choose whether to unveil 0 or
1 for at least one bit i out of the≈ q log(N +1) bits to which she commits. More precisely, for at least two different indices q, r
8in {1, 2, . . . , N + 1}, if pi(0|q) is the probability that Alice unveils a 0 for bit value i when Bob tells her the index of QB is q,
and pi(1|r) is similarly defined, then pi(0|q) + pi(1|r) > 1. But this contradicts the security of the relativistic bit commitment
protocol [3], under our assumptions about Alice’s restricted strategy. (Recall again that we neglect terms of order ǫ(N ′) in this
discussion.) Hence, given those assumptions, Alice cannot succeed in protocol T with probability greater than q
N+1 . Hence,
again given those assumptions, in our KCEKQS protocol, ǫS ≤
q
N+1 .
Completeness
We now show that ǫC → 0 as N →∞.
Proof. If Alice does know the state η, she will get a positive outcome on QB. The probability that her commitment fails to be
accepted is thus given by:
ǫC =
N∑
x=q
P (XN = x)
x + 1− q
x+ 1
, (3)
where p(XN = x) is the probability that x out of Alice’s N measurements on the N systems Si obtain the result η.
If Bob is honest and chooses the states of the systems Si at random, the result η is obtained on each run with probability
1
d
.
HenceXN is binomially distributed:
P (XN = x) =
(
N
x
)
1
dx
(1 −
1
d
)N−x . (4)
For q = N+1
d
, the distributionXN has mean q −
1
d
= N
d
. Hoeffding’s inequality implies that
P (XN ≥
N
d
+ ǫN) ≤ exp(−2ǫ2N) . (5)
It follows from equation (3) that
ǫC ≤ ǫdpmode + exp(−2ǫ
2N) (6)
for any ǫ > 0, where pmode is the maximum over x of the binomial distribution P (XN = x). We can obtain an adequate bound
simply by using pmode ≤ 1.[16]
Taking, for example, ǫ = 12N
− 1
2 (logN)
1
2 , we see that ǫC → 0 as N →∞.
Knowledge concealment
Bob begins with one copy of η. If dishonest, he may combine this with any ancillae he wishes, carry out any quantum
operations he wishes, and produce a (perhaps highly entangled) state including (N + 1) qudits that he sends to Alice, together
with a system that he retains. He may then carry out any measurement he wishes to produce an index x. Alice responds,
effectively, with either a 1 (if she unveils a commitment to x) or a 0 (if she fails to unveil a commitment to x). Bob may then
carry out any measurement he wishes on his retained system to produce his maximum possible expected squared fidelity estimate
of η. This measurement choice may depend on Alice’s response.
Effectively, Bob’s task is to optimize his state estimation in this scenario. His overall strategy S is fixed up to Alice’s response,
but then may involve different state estimation strategies depending on the one bit of information supplied by Alice. For any
given overall strategy S, the overall expected squared fidelity of his estimate is
pS(0)fS(0) + pS(1)fS(1) , (7)
where pS(b) is the probability of outcome b given strategy S and fS(b) is the expected squared fidelity obtained from S condi-
tioned on outcome b.
Suppose that Alice does not respond at all. Bob may simply follow the fixed strategy Sb given by following S and assuming
outcome b. This produces an expected squared fidelity of at least pS(b)fS(b). Since Sb is a possible strategy for the standard
task of state estimation given one copy of an unknown qudit (and no further information), we have that
pS(b)fS(b) ≤ fmax =
2
d+ 1
(8)
9where the right hand side is the maximum expected square fidelity obtainable from any state estimation strategy on an unknown
qudit [8]. Hence Bob’s overall expected squared fidelity
pS(0)fS(0) + pS(1)fS(1) ≤
4
d+ 1
. (9)
That is, ǫK ≤
4
d+1 . For comparison, we have that Bob’s optimal expected squared fidelity if he does not participate in the
protocol but simply carries out measurements on η is ǫM =
2
d+1 . Thus, for large d, the protocol is highly knowledge concealing
and close to zero knowledge.
Comment
Our discussion to date has been based on the assumption that the state η is pure. This excludes the possibility that Alice has
access to one or more systems which are entangled withQB. However, another natural scenario (call it Sc1) in which a KCEKQS
protocol might be useful is that QB is maximally entangled with a system QA in Alice’s possession, and that Alice knows the
joint state.
One option for Alice is then to perform a projective measurement on QA before the start of the protocol, so that the system
QB is subsequently in a pure state η known to her. This recreates our original scenario (call it Sc0). Thus, if Alice can succeed
in any given KCEKQS protocol with probability (1− ǫC) if she knows η, she can also succeed with probability at least (1− ǫC)
in the scenario of the previous paragraph. Conversely, while there are clearly protocols that give Bob evidence favouring Sc1
over Sc0, no KCEKQS protocol can give Bob evidence favouring Sc0 over Sc1.
Allowing an abort option
Our relativistic quantum Bob-to-Alice protocol could be altered to achieve ǫC = 0 by allowing Alice to abort the protocol
whenever she obtains a positive outcome more than q times at step five [17]. An honest Alice with perfect knowledge will abort
whenever the binomial random variable XN > q. For q =
N+1
d
and large N , this implies an abort probability of roughly 12 .
Taking q = N
d
+ ǫN , with ǫ > 0, we see from equation (5) that the abort probability can be bounded by exp(−2ǫ2N). This
gives a protocol with ǫC = 0, ǫS =
1
d
+ ǫ and with abort probability that tends to zero for largeN .
These parameters may represent a reasonable tradeoff in some circumstances. However, introducing an abort option does not
eliminate the possibility of unjustified mistrust. Without an abort option, it is possible that Alice and Bob may both honestly
follow the protocol, and that Alice may know η precisely and thus correctly identify QB as a candidate, but that Alice may
be unable to persuade Bob of this because she had more than q candidates and her random choice of a size q subset did not
include the index ofQB. Introducing an abort option removes the possibility of honest Alice being falsely suspected of cheating
by honest Bob for this specific reason. However, an honest Bob may now unfairly suspect an honest Alice of cheating if she
honestly aborts. A dishonest Alice might abort because she had no information about η, carried out no measurements, made
random or invalid commitments, and thus effectively used the protocol to steal Bob’s copy of η. Bob cannot tell whether or not
the protocol has been honestly aborted.
No version of this protocol can guarantee that honest Bob accepts the honesty of honest Alice. This is because KCEKQS is a
one-shot procedure, and this protocol has nonzero probability of either failure or abort (if there is an abort option). Bob has only
one copy of η, and so if he gives that copy to Alice and the protocol fails or is aborted, he has no further opportunity to learn
anything about η or about Alice’s knowledge of it. Of course, the parties might be able to repeat the protocol using a new state,
but even if this next protocol succeeds, Alice will have proved only that she knows the new state, which gives Bob no direct
evidence about whether she knew the previous state.
In summary, in most scenarios, it seems to us that the abort option version of the protocol gives no clear advantage.
FURTHER SECURITY ISSUES
Here we discuss several potential security issues and possible weaknesses for KCEKQS protocols which are not covered by
our earlier security definitions.
What precisely does Alice give evidence of?
We have defined security for KCEKQS in terms of two extremes, the value of ǫS giving the probability that Alice’s proof
is accepted if she knows nothing at all about the state, and the value of 1 − ǫC giving the probability that Alice’s proof is
accepted if she knows the state exactly. As noted above, there are intermediate possibilities. For example, Alice could have
a significant amount of classical knowledge about the quantum state without knowing it exactly; she could have quantum
information correlated with the state (such as a number of copies), without any additional classical information; she could
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have beliefs about the state encoded in a probability distribution. Such beliefs need not necessarily be well founded or correct:
for instance she might believe the classical description of the state is η′ 6= η.
In each case, if Alice’s information or beliefs allow her to produce a guess η′ at the classical description of η such that
Tr(ηη′) ≈ 1, she can produce what we have called “evidence of knowledge”. In each of the KCEKQS protocols described
above, Bob will accept this “evidence of knowledge” with probability close to 1− ǫC – even though Alice may not only not have
complete knowledge of η but may even have false beliefs about its classical value. As this illustrates, the notion of knowledge
of a quantum state needs careful analysis. One might be inclined to frame a definition so that if Alice believes the state is the
pure state η′, and it is actually η 6= η′, then she has no knowledge about the state, even if Tr(ηη′) ≈ 1. But if one does, one
has to accept that someone who has no knowledge about a state can nonetheless appear to give strong evidence of knowledge.
Alternatively, one might frame a definition so that, if Alice has probabilistic beliefs about the state η encapsulated in the density
matrix ρ, then Tr(ρη) is a measure of her knowledge. If so, one has to accept that false (not merely uncertain) beliefs are
consistent with a high degree of knowledge.
Without giving a precise general definition of knowledge of a quantum state, our security definitions still establish that the
protocols give evidence of knowledge of η in an interesting, if restricted, sense. Namely, they strengthen the evidence for the
hypothesis that Alice knows the precise classical value of η compared to the hypothesis that she has no classical or quantum
information correlated with η.
One might frame additional security definitions that allow more to be established. For example, one could require strong
non-triviality: if Alice does not have and is not able to obtain a precise classical description of η, then the probability that her
proof is accepted is strictly less than (1 − ǫC). This requirement holds for our classical relativistic KCEKQS protocol 1 and
for our quantum B-to-A protocol but does not hold for our classical relativistic KCEKQS protocol 2, in which Alice can ensure
acceptance probability (1− ǫC) even if she only knows a subspace of Hilbert space of dimension q = ǫSd in which the state lies.
Nor does it hold for our quantum A-to-B protocols, in which Alice can ensure acceptance probability (1 − ǫC) even if she only
has some way of producing precisely N copies of η (and no more), and no other classical or quantum information correlated
with η.
Composability and Accumulation of Information
Zero-knowledge proofs are often used as sub-protocols in the construction of more complex protocols, such as electronic
voting schemes and digital signature schemes. One might hope that our knowledge-concealing protocols could be used as
building blocks for quantum protocols of this type. One security concern here is composability: our security arguments hold
for single-shot instances of the protocol, and collective attacks on combinations of several protocols would need to be addressed
separately. Among other things, since the amount of information obtained by Bob in a KCEKQS protocol will never be exactly
zero for any finite-dimensional quantum state, one would have to consider carefully whether Bob’s information gains could
accumulate in such a way as to undermine the overall security. We leave further investigation for future work.
Alternative Measures of Bob’s information gain
Density matrices characterise an agent’s knowledge about the outcomes of measurements that may be made on a system; they
do not completely characterise an agent’s knowledge of how that system was prepared. Our knowledge-concealing criterion
thus does not necessarily characterise all the information Bob might learn in the course of any conceivable protocol. As a
hypothetical illustration for the case of a qubit, if Bob were somehow to learn in the course of a protocol that the original state
was definitely either the state |+〉 or the state |−〉, there is a sense in which he has gained significant information. However, the
density matrix ρ describing his new state of knowledge and the density matrix describing his knowledge before the protocol are
both the maximally mixed state. Our fidelity-based knowledge-concealment criterion would thus suggest that he has gained no
information.
We believe that ǫK is nonetheless a good measure of Bob’s information gain for a single shot protocol, because it quantifies
Bob’s ability to predict the outcome of measurements on a system in the state η and/or to prepare a state that successfully
simulates the state η. These operationally defined measures of information about a state are relevant in most cryptographic
contexts and are the only relevant measures in some.
That said, there is no unique measure of information about a quantum state that characterises every property that is relevant
in every possible scenario. Even assuming that Bob’s aim is to produce a guess η′ at η that optimizes some cost function, and
assuming also that the cost function depends only and monotonically on F (η, η′), there are still infinitely many cost functions
that may be considered. As a simple example, Bob might be given a fixed reward if and only if F (η, η′) > 1− ǫ for some small
ǫ > 0. In this case, a sensible parameter might be ǫ′K, defined as the probability of this condition holding after the protocol if
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Bob follows an optimal strategy. A sensible comparison would then be to ǫ′M, the probability of it holding if Bob instead carries
out his optimal strategy that involves operations only on the unknown state.
What does Alice learn?
We have considered in detail the amount of information that Bob gains about the state η in the course of our protocols, but
we have not thus far considered how much Alice could potentially learn about η if she does not in fact know this state. In some
applications it might not matter if Alice gains information about η, but if we are using a KCEKQS protocol precisely because
knowledge of the state η has value in some context (such as quantummoney[9] or quantum voting[10]), then it may be important
to limit the amount of information that might potentially be gained by a dishonest Alice.
Both parties may also be concerned about the information available to an eavesdropper Eve who intercepts protocol commu-
nications. In principle, eavesdropping can be completely prevented by using secure classical and quantum channels. Secure
classical channels can be ensured by using one time pads. In practice, though, secure quantum channels require distributing and
storing perfect entangled states, so that quantum eavesdropping presently remains a practical concern. We will assume secure
classical channels but potentially insecure quantum channels below.
The quantumAlice-to-Bob protocols give Alice no additional information. Bob need not tell Alice whether or not his measure-
ment obtained a positive result, so Alice learns nothing whatsoever from the protocol. However, these protocols are vulnerable
to quantum eavesdropping, since Eve could intercept the state copies sent by an honest Alice, and obtain information by state
estimation.
In our classical protocols, assuming that Bob performs the protocol correctly and honestly, Alice can gain some information
about the state since Bob must tell Alice the result of a measurement that he has performed on the system QB. But clearly
since Alice obtains information about the state only via Bob’s classical communication, she learns no more than Bob does in the
course of such protocols, if she begins with no knowledge about the state.[18]
Our quantum Bob-to-Alice protocol is significantly vulnerable to a dishonest Alice who wishes to obtain rather than prove
knowledge. If Bob performs this protocol honestly he learns nothing whatsoever about η from the protocol. However, a dishonest
Alice can store all the quantum states sent to her and make commitments to random indices, or fail to make valid commitments
at all. She can then perform a measurement onQB after Bob has told her the index ofQB. Effectively, she can thus steal η from
Bob and obtain as much information about it as he could have obtained unaided. For large d, this strategy has a low probability
of successfully persuading Bob that Alice has honestly followed the protocol and knew the state. Nonetheless, Alice dishonestly
gains some information about η, whereas an honest Bob sacrifices his copy of η and gains no information at all. If Eve intercepts
the quantum communications but not the classical communications, she can steal all the states sent by Bob but will not learn
which one is η. If N is large, she can thus obtain very little information about η.
For large d, the information a dishonest Alice can gain is small, assuming she begins with no information; for large N , the
information Eve can obtain is even smaller. Still, in contexts where even limited information about η is highly valuable, these
are undesirable weaknesses.
What if Bob has additional information?
We have calculated bounds on the information that Bob gains during the course of each protocol assuming he starts with
strictly zero knowledge about the state of QB and only ever has a single copy of the state of QB.
In other possible scenarios, Bob might also have some limited classical information about η, or have additional correlated
quantum information (for example further copies of η), or both. Our bounds do not necessarily apply in such scenarios. For
example, suppose that Bob hasMq copies of η, for some largeM , and that he and Alice perform classical relativistic KCEKQS
protocol 2. Bob can apply the projective measurement specified by Alice on every copy in his possession. Suppose that Alice is
honest, and suppose also that ǫC ≪ (Mq)
−1. Bob is then likely to obtain positive outcomes for r elements of the measurement
basis, where r ≤ q. This allows him to identify a subspace V of dimension r such that Tr(PV η) ≈ 1.
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Bob has a black box that emits a single pure state qudit which is, from his perspective, uniformly distributed.
Alice wishes to give Bob evidence that she has knowledge about the emitted state while giving him little or no
information about it. We show that zero-knowledge evidencing of such knowledge is impossible in quantum
relativistic protocols, extending a previous result of Horodecki et al.. We also show that no such protocol can
be both sound and complete. We present a new quantum relativistic protocol which we conjecture to be close to
optimal in security against Alice and which reveals little knowledge to Bob, for large dimension d. We analyse
its security against general attacks by Bob and restricted attacks by Alice.
INTRODUCTION
Zero-knowledge proving is a cryptographic primitive in
which one agent proves a fact to another agent without giv-
ing away any information other than that the fact is true. It
has a wide range of practical applications, particularly in elec-
tronic voting schemes [2] and digital signature schemes [3],
and is also used for a variety of theoretical purposes, such as
showing that a language is easy to prove [4]. Zero-knowledge
proving of knowledge, where Alice is required to prove only
that she knows some fact, without giving Bob any information
about the fact itself, is a particularly useful version of this task
which plays a key role in a number of identification protocols
[5].
Horodecki et al. [6] explored the possibility of what they
called a “zero knowledge convincing protocol on quantum
bit”. In their model, a verifier (henceforth called Bob) knows
he has a single copy of a pure qubit, but has no other infor-
mation about the state. A prover (henceforth called Alice)
wishes to make a prediction that Bob can verify and that will
hold with certainty only if she knows what the state is, with-
out giving Bob any additional information about its identity.
They showed that no non-relativistic protocol involving clas-
sical information exchanges and quantum Alice-to-Bob com-
munications can implement this task securely [6]. They also
discussed some protocols that implement very weak versions
of the task, either giving Bob a great deal of information about
the qubit, or giving him only weak evidence of Alice’s knowl-
edge, or both.
Horodecki et al.’s pioneering discussion was informal on
some points. It did not fully distinguish cases in which Al-
ice has classical knowledge about Bob’s quantum state (e.g.
a classical data string describing it) from cases in which she
has quantum knowledge (e.g. a box able to make only some
fixed number of copies). Nor did it underline that Alice can-
not prove that she knows a precise classical description of a
single quantum state even if she is not concerned about about
giving Bob information. This is because the classical infor-
mation about the state that can be extracted by measurement
is bounded, and Alice always has a boundedly nonzero chance
of guessing this information even if she knows nothing about
the state. (See Theorem 2 below.) Alice may also have a high
chance of guessing the information even if she has only partial
information about the quantum state – for example, she can
predict the outcome of a complete projective measurement on
a qubit with probability 12 . Similarly, even if she only knows a
dimension 2 subspace in which a qudit lies, she can still spec-
ify a complete projective measurement whose outcome she
can predict with probability 12 . Moreover, if the state is η and
Alice believes it is η′, where the fidelity F (η, η′) is close to
1, then she is almost as likely to pass any protocol testing her
knowledge of η as she would be if she knew η. Since Bob
only has a single copy of the state, Alice cannot provide more
evidence by repeating a protocol that tests her knowledge. By
contrast, in classical contexts Alice’s chances of success can
typically be made arbitrarily small by iteration, so that one can
reasonably (modulo epsilonics) speak of classical zero knowl-
edge proofs.
Other interesting questions left open include: What can rel-
ativistic protocols achieve? How much evidence can Alice
provide? What bounds exist on the tradeoffs between the evi-
dence Alice provides and the amount of knowledge she gives
away? Are there protocols strong enough for practical crypto-
graphic purposes? How do the answers depend on the dimen-
sion d of the state space?
We explore these questions below, beginning with some
formal definitions. We prove a stronger no-go theorem show-
ing that no protocol that provides non-trivial evidence of Al-
ice’s knowledge about a pure quantum state of finite dimen-
sion can prevent Bob from acquiring some additional knowl-
edge about the state, even in the setting of relativistic quantum
cryptography. We also prove a bound on the strength of ev-
idence Alice can provide. Since proofs of knowledge of a
finite-dimensional quantum state are not possible, and zero-
2knowledge protocols that give some evidence of knowledge
are also not possible, we then consider the weaker but feasible
task of knowledge-concealing evidencing of knowledge about
a quantum state (KCEKQS).
A KCEKQS protocol requires Alice to give Bob evidence
that she has some form of knowledge about a quantum state
whilst giving him incomplete information about the state. Ide-
ally, a successfully completed protocol should give Bob as
much evidence as possible, without assuming Alice’s honesty.
Ideally, too, the protocol should ensure as small a bound as
possible on the information obtainable by Bob, whether or not
it is successfully completed or he honestly follows it. We dis-
cuss some simple protocols, generalising protocols previously
considered by Horodecki et al. [6], and show that they are
relatively weak in knowledge-concealment, or in evidencing
knowledge, or both. We then propose a new relativistic quan-
tum protocol. We show it is secure against restricted attacks
by Alice and general attacks by Bob, for large d, in a sense
we make precise below. We conjecture this remains true for
general attacks by Alice.
DEFINITIONS
We assume for now that Alice has no option to abort
the protocol; allowing an abort option does not significantly
change our main results [1].
A non-relativistic knowledge-concealing evidencing of
knowledge about a quantum state (KCEKQS) protocol in-
volves two mistrustful parties, Alice and Bob, occupying dis-
joint secure laboratories. We assume that each party has
trusted error-free devices in their own laboratory; both parties
trust error-free classical and quantum communication chan-
nels between the laboratories; we consider errors and losses
later [1]. Bob begins in possession of a quantum system QB
known to be prepared in some pure state η = |η〉 〈η| drawn
uniformly at random from QB . The protocol requires Alice
and Bob to act on alternate rounds and terminates after a fixed
finite number of rounds. Each round may require a party to
carry out unitary operations and/or measurements on a quan-
tum system in their possession and/or to send classical and/or
quantum information to the other party. The protocol may
specify that these actions are probabilistically determined, ac-
cording to given probability distributions. The final round of
the protocol requires Bob to generate one of two possible out-
comes, 0 and 1, from the classical and quantum information
in his possession. These correspond to Bob’s rejecting or ac-
cepting that Alice has provided evidence of knowledge about
η. We write p(0) and p(1) for the outcome probabilities.
In a relativistic KCEKQS protocol, each party may have
several trusted agents occupying separate secure laboratories,
with secure communications between them, lying within pre-
agreed regions. One agent of Bob’s initially possesses QB .
The protocol requires Alice’s and Bob’s agents to carry out
unitary operations and/or measurements on quantum systems
in their possession and to send classical and/or quantum com-
munications to given other agents of the same party and/or the
other party, within their agreed location regions and within
agreed time intervals. The protocol may specify these actions
are probabilistically determined, according to given probabil-
ity distributions. The protocol terminates after a fixed finite
number of such actions. The final prescribed action is for one
of Bob’s agents to generate one of two possible outcomes, 0
and 1, from the classical and quantum information in his pos-
session, as above.
We will characterise the efficiency of an ideal KCEKQS
protocol by three parameters ǫC, ǫK and ǫS; we discuss other
relevant features of KCEKQS protocols in the supplementary
material [1]. When evaluating these parameters for specific
protocols, we will mostly consider the ideal case of error-
free devices and channels. In realistic implementations, chan-
nel noise, device errors and losses may alter the parameter
values.[14] However, our no-go theorems below still hold in
reasonable models of noise, errors and losses, so long as these
are uncorrelated with η and with any knowledge Alice may
have of or about η.
We define our parameters by the following criteria, in each
case averaging over η:
• Completeness: If Alice has a precise classical descrip-
tion of η and both parties perform the protocol correctly,
then p(1) = 1− ǫC.
• Soundness: If Alice has no classical or quantum infor-
mation about the state η, then ǫS is the supremum of
p(1) over all possible (honest or dishonest) strategies
for Alice, assuming that Bob performs the protocol cor-
rectly.
• Knowledge-concealing: Suppose that Alice performs
the protocol correctly and at the start of the protocol
Bob knows nothing about the state η. Then ǫK is the
supremum of the expected squared fidelity F 2(η, φ) =
| 〈η|φ〉 |2 over (honest or dishonest) strategies that give
Bob the value of a pure state φ as a guess for η.
Let ǫM be the supremum of the same expected squared fi-
delity obtainable by Bob if he does not take part in the pro-
tocol and carries out quantum operations and measurements
on QB . We call ǫK − ǫM the knowledge gain available from
the protocol to a dishonest Bob. We say the protocol is zero-
knowledge if ǫK = ǫM, We say it is non-trivial if 1− ǫC > ǫS.
As defined above, general protocols allow both classical
and quantum communications in both directions. We will also
consider examples with more restricted communications. Ex-
tending the discussion of Ref. [6], we consider classical pro-
tocols, in which Alice and Bob employ only classical commu-
nication, quantum A-to-B protocols, which additionally allow
quantum communications fromA to B, and similarly quantum
B-to-A protocols.
3NO-GO THEOREMS
Horodecki et al. [6] showed that no non-relativistic
KCEKQS classical or quantum A-to-B protocol for an un-
known qubit has ǫC = 0, ǫS < 1, and is zero-knowledge. We
establish here a considerably more general result, applying to
relativistic KCEKQS protocols for qudits with two-way clas-
sical and/or quantum communications, and general parame-
ter values. Our statements apply to protocols whose security
is based only on quantum theory and special relativity, i.e.
within the standard scenario for unconditionally secure rela-
tivistic quantum cryptography [8].
Theorem 1. There exists no non-trivial zero-knowledge
KCEKQS protocol. [1]
We also establish a tradeoff between completeness and
soundness which bounds the degree of evidence Alice can
provide:
Theorem 2. For any qudit KCEKQS protocol, ǫS1−ǫC ≥
1
d
. [1]
In particular, theorem 2 means that for small d, ǫS and ǫC
cannot both be close to 0, regardless of the value of ǫK. This
makes the case of large d particularly interesting to explore.
We observe that the bound of theorem 2 is tight. For ex-
ample, it is attained by a protocol in which Alice predicts to
Bob the outcome of a projective measurement that includes η
on the system QB: this has ǫS =
1
d
and ǫC = 0. More gen-
erally, it is attained for a protocol in which Alice is required
to predict this outcome and also predict the outcome of some
independent random event with success probability p: this has
ǫS =
p
d
and ǫC = 1− p. We say a KCEKQS qudit protocol is
CS-optimal if ǫS =
1
d
, ǫC = 0.
PROTOCOLS
Classical A-to-B
As noted above, Horodecki et al. [6] argue that non-trivial
non-relativistic zero-knowledge classical A-to-B protocols
with ǫC = 0 are impossible for a qubit. In any such proto-
col, Alice must predict some measurement outcome, and any
measurement prediction that holds with certainty for a pure
qubit η and is not certain for a random qubit allows Bob to
identify η exactly, and so has ǫK = 1.
Onemight instead consider protocolswith ǫC > 0, in which
Alice chooses a projective measurement which includes a ran-
domly chosen projector P from those with 〈η|P |η〉 = 1− ǫC.
One might also consider strengthening such protocols by al-
lowing Alice to use a secure relativistic bit commitment [7–
11] to commit her predicted outcome, unveiling this commit-
ment if and only if Bob’s reported outcome agrees with her
prediction. However, such protocols still have either ǫK or ǫC
large [1].
Quantum A-to-B
Horodecki et al. [6] also consider a protocol where Alice
gives Bob a copy of η; as they note, such protocols can achieve
ǫC = 0 and ǫK < 1. Indeed it is possible to achieve ǫK ≪ 1
for large d. In this sense, for large d, their protocol outper-
forms the classical A-to-B protocols just discussed. However,
one needs to consider the tradeoffs between ǫK, ǫC and ǫS. It is
also worth highlighting that this protocol requires Alice only
to possess quantum information about η rather than classical
information. Alice can ensure p(1) = 1 even if she only has
a black box that will make only a single copy of η and has no
other classical or quantum information about η.
We extend the discussion of Ref. [6] by considering a gen-
eralisation of their protocol in which Alice gives BobN copes
of η:
1. Alice preparesN systems {Si} in the state η and gives
them to Bob.
2. Bob performs a measurement {ΠS , I−ΠS} where ΠS
is the projector onto the symmetric subspace of the joint
state space of the {Si} andQB .[15]
3. If the result is ΠS , Bob accepts; otherwise he rejects.
If Alice knows η and follows the protocol, Bob will accept,
so this protocol achieves ǫC = 0. We show [1] that ǫS =
1
N+1 +
N
d(N+1) . So, for N = 1, we have ǫS =
1
2 +
1
2d ,
while, for N large, ǫS →
1
d
, so the protocol tends to CS-
optimality in this limit. However, we also show [1] that ǫK =
N+2
N+d+1 , which tends to 1 for largeN , while ǫM =
2
d+1 . Thus
ǫK >
1
dǫS
and ǫK − ǫM >
d−1
d+1
N
N+2
1
dǫS
for all d,N , which
are relatively poor tradeoffs. In particular, near CS-optimality
(ǫS ≈
1
d
) implies near-zero concealment (ǫK ≈ 1) and implies
significant knowledge gain (ǫK − ǫM ≈
d−1
d+1 ).
A quantum B-to-A protocol
We now propose a new relativistic protocol that involves
quantum B-to-A and two way classical communication.
Given certain security assumptions, we show that, the protocol
asymptotically tends to CS-optimality in the limit where the
security parameterN is large, taking the parameter q = ⌈N
d
⌉.
We conjecture that this remains true without the relevant as-
sumptions.
We show that ǫK ≤
4
d+1 , while ǫM =
2
d+1 , so ǫK → 0 and
ǫK − ǫM → 0 for large d [1].
1. Alice and Bob agree in advance on positive integer se-
curity parametersN and q.
2. Bob preparesN quantum systems {Si} in states chosen
uniformly at random.
43. Bob randomly permutes the systems {Si} and the sys-
tem QB, assigns them all indices from 1 to N + 1, and
then gives all N + 1 systems, labelled by their indices,
to Alice.
4. Alice carries out the projective measurement {η , I−η}
on each of the N + 1 systems that Bob gave her. Write
C′ for the list of indices for which she obtains outcome
η; let |C′| = q′. If q′ ≤ q, she forms a list C = C′ ∪D,
whereD is a list of (q− q′) copies of the dummy index
0.[16]. If q′ > q, she picks a random size q sublist C of
C′.
5. Alice randomly permutes C and then performs q rel-
ativistic bit string commitments [1] committing her to
each of the indices in the permuted list. Each bit string
commitment is set up so that Alice can commit to any
index in {0, 1, 2, . . .N + 1}.
6. Bob tells Alice the index x ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1} that he
assigned to QB.
7. If x ∈ C, Alice unveils her commitment to that index.
Otherwise she announces failure and Bob rejects.[17]
8. If Alice’s unveiled commitment is indeed x, Bob ac-
cepts. Otherwise he rejects.
We analyse the security of this protocol in the supplemen-
tary material. We show the bound on ǫK above holds for any
attacks by Bob, and that ǫC → 0 for q = ⌊
N
d
⌋ in the large
N limit. We also show that ǫS ≈
1
d
if Alice is restricted to
strategies in which she commits to q classical values chosen
from {0, . . . , N + 1} and unveils one of these committed val-
ues. A full security analysis requires a complete analysis of
general quantum operations Alice could carry out to produce
unveiling data; we leave this for future work.
CONCLUSION
We have proven two no-go theorems demonstrating that
even in the relativistic setting there is no perfect KCEKQS
protocol for quantum states of finite dimension and bound-
ing the evidence Alice can supply. We have also described
a new protocol involving quantum Bob-to-Alice communica-
tions and relativistic signalling constraints, which appears to
achieve a significant improvement on existing protocols for
large d. Although it is not zero knowledge for finite d, it re-
veals little extra information to Bob for large d. We conjecture
that it is asymptotically CS-optimal, i.e. offers essentially op-
timal security against Alice. We anticipate that this protocol
may be a valuable quantum cryptographic primitive in con-
texts where marginal revelations of information to Bob are
acceptable.
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